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ABSTRACT
A majority of the work on digital privacy and security has focused on users from developed countries
who account for only around 20% of the global population. Moreover, the privacy needs for population
that is already marginalized and vulnerable differ from users who have privilege to access a greater
social support system. We reflect on our experiences of introducing computers and the Internet to
a group of sex-trafficking survivors in Nepal and highlight a few socio-political factors that have
influenced the design space around digital privacy. These factors include the population’s limited
digital and text literacy skills and the fear of stigma against trafficked persons widely prevalent in
Nepali society. We underscore the need to widen our perspective by focusing on practicable privacy,
that is, privacy practices that are (1) usable, (2) acceptable, and (3) appropriable.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past three years, we have been working with an anti-trafficking non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO) in Nepal and exploring prospects for sex-trafficking survivors living in a shelter home.
Undertaking an asset-based approach [13, 16], we have worked with a group of survivors1 to identify1The survivors addressed each other as “sisters”.
I addressed the survivors as “sisters” as well. To
match this nomenclature, I shall henceforth call
the group we worked with “sister-survivors”.
their existing strengths and seek ways to build upon it. One such way has involved the development
and introduction of technology, and with it, we have encountered concerns around privacy and
security.
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The sister-survivors’ needs for privacy around technology are different from the dominant discourse
in the West due to a myriad of reasons including: (1) the sister-survivors are vulnerable, most have
limited digital and text literacy, and have fewer opportunities to learn or use technology, (2) the
sister-survivors have limited private physical space in the shelter home and are likely to have similar
limited space after they leave the shelter home, (3) sex-trafficking survivors face stigma in Nepali
society resulting in many being shunned by family and friends, and (4) Nepal, in general, can be
considered a collectivist society [11] so following some of the commonly acceptable privacy practices
that stem from more-individualistic Western mores may lead to ostracization.
One of the elements of strengths that the sister-survivors possessed is their strong mutual bond with
one another [7]. We observed the mutual bond being manifested in the wide range of support they
provided each other when working on handicrafts, a task they did as part of their skill-based training
program at the shelter home. When we introduced a web application to a group of sister-survivors,
we noticed that they leveraged their mutual bond to use and appropriate the technology [9]. They
were also able to negotiate practices around the technology, including ways to protect their privacy
(Figure 1). By leveraging their strengths, they were able to make the technology their own.
Figure 1: The sister-survivors feared being
identified as a trafficked person.Whenwe
introduced a web application to a group
of sister-survivors, we observed that they
helped each other to hide when recording
videos using a webcam.
Building on the experience, we believe that there is a possibility of leveraging the sister-survivors’
mutual bond to support privacy practices around technology, even after they leave the shelter home.
In particular, we see a possibility of presenting privacy, not as an individual’s prerogative which is
common in the West, but rather explore privacy as a collectively-held value requiring mutual support.
We are currently exploring the communal use and appropriation of technology, and examining
collective practices around privacy in the shelter home. Overall, in this workshop, we hope to present
some of our observations from the field, the socio-cultural influences that shape our design space,
learn about other participants’ experiences, and chart out possible ways to support the sister-survivors’
privacy and security around technology.
INFLUENTIAL FACTORS
In this section, we highlight some of the socio-cultural factors that have influenced our approach and
have led us to seek alternative ways of thinking about privacy.
Limited Digital and Text Literacy
The sister-survivors typically have limited text and digital literacy [7, 14]. Privacy vulnerability arising
due to lack of digital and text literacy has been documented both in developing [3, 24] and developed
countries [17, 21]. Further, English has become the de facto language for many technology applications
and lack of familiarity with it adds to the barrier in making informed digital privacy decisions. Several
web-based terminologies are phonetically translated in Nepali technologies with words such as “login”
and “logout” being commonplace. However, these words held little meaning to the sister-survivors [8].
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This reflects on practices around privacy as well. There is no Nepali word or phrase that encapsulates
ideas of privacy, that is, of ownership and flow of data. The closest words refer to secrecy, seclusion,
or insulation. Thus, even before presenting potential technical approaches, we see a need for building
common ground such as by engaging in participatory approaches so that the participants can define
and act upon their own idea(s) of ownership and flow of data.
Proposing a set of universal set privacy prac-
tices may not be helpful. Privacy practices have
to be usable considering the varying skills pos-
sessed by the targeted group, culturally accept-
able so that it does not lead to ostracization,
and appropriable such that groups can adapt
and make the practices their own. We believe
that the three conditions are critical to pro-
moting practicable privacy, especially for those
who are already in margins.
In our particular context, considering that the
sister-survivors hold valuable strength in their
mutual bond, these three practices could in-
form design in the following ways:
• Usable:
– Elicit and use terminologies that make
sense to them; design to overcome digi-
tal and text literacy.
– Design for collective use and support
– Support obfuscation [7] to ensure they can
have plausible deniability to protect them-
selves from stigma.
• Acceptable:
– Align privacy practice with the local cul-
ture such as the collectivist nature of soci-
ety.
– Support multi-level group use and collabo-
ration by making individual activities per-
ceptible to others in the group.
• Appropriable:
– Design to ensure that, as a group, they can
put their knowledge together to decide the
next step.
– Build support to make it easy to get
started and encourage multiple ways of
doing things.
Collectivist Values and Lack of Power
Research already shows that people who are marginalized face great privacy vulnerability. Studies
conducted in the United States have shown how technology places the poor [10, 15, 20], elderly [4],
and disabled people [4] at risk to be scammed, subjected to fraud, stalked and impersonated. The
interaction of two or more social disadvantages results in even greater digital vulnerability [12]. A
contributing factor is that people with lower digital skills and socioeconomic standing (SES) have
limited opportunity to learn about or seek support towards digital privacy [21].
The disadvantages discussed above are more pronounced when we look at privacy vulnerabilities
in the Global South but so too are communal practices. Societies such as in Nepal, India and many
countries in the Global South could be considered being more collectivist [11]. Mobile phones are
seen less as individually-owned information devices and more as shared communication devices. It
raises several privacy-related concerns (e.g. [1, 22, 23]). A significant part of information gathering in
Nepal’s context involves interactions with local people, friends, and families. Anecdotally, it is fairly
common for either of my parents who are native Nepali, fairly well-educated and digitally literate, to
hand over their phone to an employee in a mobile (repair) store and request help without encrypting
or locking applications.
Desiring for privacy could lead to being ostracized. The sister-survivors mentioned that doing
something different than their family led them being “othered”, with them being labeled as “a haughty
person who thinks she is better than us [family members]” (S2). Fear from such ostracization is
commonly held by the sister-survivors and is further accentuated by their fear of raising suspicion
or being identified as a trafficked person. The sister-survivors have limited power to negotiate such
societal practices. Seeking privacy, particularly around technology, is othered by the sister-survivors.
This othering resonates with Sambasivan et al.’s study of women in South Asia who believed that
privacy was “for those rich women” [22].
OUR PRIOR ATTEMPT AND NEXT STEP
Fear-Driven Practices
Following the introduction of a web application connected to a local server, the sister-survivors
expressed an interest in learning about and using the Internet. We discussed how the Internet works
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and the various ways in which we can use it to access information. Following that, we asked what
steps they took to keep themselves safe in their day-to-day life. In this group elicitation session, they
mentioned practices such as “do not talk to strangers”, “do not go to unfamiliar places”, and “keep an
eye out for danger”. We discussed and drew parallels to practices in the digital world. Synthesizing
their day-to-day practices and extending it to the digital world led to a set of four easy-to-follow rules
to remain safe while using the Internet (see sidebar).
The four rules that came up through the pro-
cess were:
(1) Do not visit websites that you are not fa-
miliar with; ask the trainer about it before
visiting
(2) Check for a padlock and ensure there is no
red sign on the top of the browser before
sharing information even for websites that
you trust
(3) Check that there is no light near the web-
cam if you do not want to use a webcam
(4) Do not use Facebook or any website to con-
tact people outside the shelter home
The rules were formulated ad hoc and they all suggest a fear-driven approach to privacy. They do
not convey positive values around the use of the Internet, and, more critically, could hinder adoption
and appropriation moving forward. In that sense, they are not practicable in the long run.
Towards Collective Privacy Practices
We noticed that the sister-survivors were supporting each other while using the Internet. These
include reminding others of the four rules, suggesting ways to navigate out of unsafe sites, and finding
whether the website is safe or not. These lead us to believe that there is a possibility, in this context,
of promoting privacy as a collective practice.
Prior work has shown the value of social relationships in promoting learning of security and privacy
practices (e.g. [5, 6, 19]). For example, Pierce et al. 2018 found that most security tool were designed
for individual users. They posit that security and safety are socially contingent and hence there is a
need for security and privacy that support collective action [18].
However, it is worth noting that collective action within a limited group may not be sufficient. This
is especially true for people with limited digital literacy who may have fewer people in their network to
clarify and support in technology-related concerns, and they may develop mental models that hinder
their privacy decisions [2, 25]. Thus we are exploring the possibility of multi-level groups defined by
the user – friends and families, locally situated individuals, NGO staff members, and external experts
and curated resources – to support collective privacy practices.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS PRACTICABLE PRIVACY
The sister-survivors’ limited digital and text literacy skills and their fear of being stigmatized in society
being identified as a trafficked person, defines our design space. Further, we have to be cognizant of
broader society’s values and orientation. In our case, Nepali society is collectivist to a large extent
and we observed similar orientation among the sister-survivors [9].
We hope to call for privacy practices that vulnerable populations can use without fear of social
exclusion and can modify it to adjust it to their needs and values. This leads us to three critical
conditions that we believe are required in any socio-technical systems to promote privacy: (1) usable,
(2) socially acceptable, and (3) appropriable. While these conditions are not exhaustive, we believe
that they will help create practicable privacy for vulnerable populations.
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